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Abstract. The article reasons that the tenets around which the analyses of policy failures often revolve may 
lead to flawed causal conclusions. Building on data about policy tools for green growth, it hence demonstrates 
how Qualitative Comparative Analysis can overcome these shortcomings if applied to a Realist understanding of 
poor policy results – thus contributing to the debate on models and strategies for explaining policy failures. 
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Introduction 
As many concepts in social sciences, that of ‘policy failure’ is only apparently 
straightforward: when boiled down to a precise analytical model, much of its boundaries 
and contents depend on the literature one refers to. Despite differences, however, 
definitions seem to agree on three intertwined tenets: that failure is a linear yet 
multidimensional opposite of success; that its understanding mainly rests on remote 
antecedents; and that explanations are necessarily overdetermined (Howlett 2012; 
McConnell 2010, 2011; Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters 1998, 2001; Gray 1998, 1996; 
Bovens and ’t Hart 1996).  
These three tenets make perfect sense within an interpretativist strategy: they 
equip researchers for hunting crucial sequences with an encompassing concept of failure 
and a preference for case studies. Yet, such equipment proves unsuitable for explanatory 
research: studies committed to these tenets could neither demonstrate crucial 
sequences to be actual causes of failure nor that success would have followed had these 
sequences been avoided.  
To the extent that a clear ascription of causality is essential to blame avoidance 
and lesson learning, an analytical shift is then required that makes unambiguous 
explanation possible. This article aims to contribute to failure studies by indicating a 
reasoned ontological and methodological direction for it. 
After examining the limits of the three tenets (§1) the article thus considers the 
gains of adopting a ‘Realist’ approach to policy failings (§2), hence of applying the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis to explanatory models (§3). The issue of green growth 
in the EU15 is then presented as a case for the joint exercise of the analytical approach 
and of the method (§4). Conclusions (§5) will discuss results. 
 
1. Three tenets in policy failure studies  
and reasons to shift away when looking for causality 
In reviewing the failure literature, Howlett remarks how a «common way to treat policy 
failure […] is as the reverse of policy success in the sense that whatever does not 
succeed is a failure» (2012:542). At the same time, this literature also acknowledges 
that policies are complex, so that they can crash along many dimensions. In the effort of 
providing more accurate accounts of such multidimensionality, definitions have thus 
increasingly widened over time. 
While Dunleavy (1995:52) considered «disasters» as «significant and 
substantially costly» decision or non-decisions, Gray (1996:74–83) confined them to 
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those policies alone which had failed against «nearly every possible» criteria – so 
implying that failures occur whenever some relevant standard is not met. In addressing 
the issue from the side of policy success, Moore (1995:71) specified these relevant 
criteria in (a) legitimation, (b) capacity to deliver the intended goods to the right 
beneficiaries, (c) satisfaction of main clients and stakeholders; the lack of even one 
property was deemed enough for a policy to fail (McConnell 2011). The relevance of 
social discontent was especially emphasized by Bovens and ’t Hart, who focused on 
«fiasco» as «a negative event perceived by a socially and politically significant group of 
people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy 
failures of public policymakers» (1996:15). Fiascoes are hence different from failures in 
that the former impute responsibilities independently from evaluators’ findings, and are 
politicized. Later, Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters singled «program failure», which «occurs 
when a policy decision, plan or strategy that has been implemented fails to have the 
desired impact», out of «political failure», indicating a lack of «the support and 
momentum necessary for its (long-term) survival as a prioritized area of government 
activity» (1998:200). A fourfold typology was then derived (2001) that McConnell 
(2010b) later expanded by adding a third analytical layer. After him, policies can be 
classified as failures or successes in each dimension according to special ‘indicators’: 
whether the expected goods are delivered to the intended recipients (program); how 
legitimate the decision-making is deemed and whether it consolidates coalitions 
(process); how the policy strengthens the decision-makers’ reputation and prospects 
(political) (ibid.:46). Howlett (2012) further specified the properties of a failure in its 
extent, duration, visibility, avoidability, intentionality, intensity; and supplemented the 
framework with deductive prescriptions. 
The search for higher definitional precision has thus stretched the concept to 
cover the many failings a policy can undergo, and constructed types by combining kinds 
of failures. Such extension is justified from the epistemic perspective of case-oriented 
analyses, where expectations and prescriptions can follow if the nature of a phenomenon 
is understood exactly within an «explanatory typology» (Elman 2005). However, from 
the viewpoint of causal analysis, such extension comes at some price – heuristic, logical, 
normative and ontological.  
Heuristically, the classification implies the tautological identification of the 
explanandum and of the explanans as far as it is used not to develop testable 
expectations of the types’ behavior, but to construct the object of analysis while 
accounting for it. Logically, as full success depends on the joint non-occurrence of the 
many possible failings, the framework states the practical impossibility of policy success, 
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and legitimizes a focus on negative cases only that can bias conclusions (Most and Starr 
2003). Normatively, in establishing low consensus as a kind of failure, the framework 
assumes as possible and desirable a world where policies can please the whole of the 
community interests – somehow at odds with the basic democratic requisite of interest 
pluralism; moreover, in setting the survival of a program as an indicator of success, it 
takes a questionable stance in favor of the stability of policy regimes over time. Finally, 
the framework treats the dimensions as ontologically equal criteria, so dismissing the 
causal relationship between them as either irrelevant or given – again a presumption 
that may rather deserve an empirical assessment. 
 
The ontology implied by the extended concept of failure is usually completed by another 
assumption: that government is the chief cause, hence what the research shall focus on 
for prescriptions. 
Such assumption may result from a deliberate shortcut through an intricate 
empirical representation: Bovens and ’t Hart’s analysis highlighted how disputable the 
identification is of crucial actors and key sequences, hence the ascription of 
responsibilities (1996:60); later, they explicitly decided to narrow the list of candidates 
for blame down to governments alone – as, despite «… not having control over many of 
the factors that may have produced the problems», «governments bear the ultimate 
burden for success and, most of all, failure» (Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters 2001:12; 
Howlett 2012). Also, when policy failure is directly framed from the perspective of the 
rulers’ interest and strategy, a government-centered causation may turn out to be 
implied by the definition itself: for instance in McConnell (2010b), where the success of a 
program «is a more-or-less interrupted achievement of what government set out to 
achieve» (ibid.:67); a successful process «basically ‘gets the job done’ for government» 
(ibid.:64); and political success overlaps «the classic ‘vote-winning’ or reputation-
building policy» (ibid.:73). Whatever the reason, such analytical framework embodies 
the time-honored belief that politics determines policy – and, given the delegation chain, 
as any performance cannot but follow the properties of the top, the top is the ultimate 
antecedent of any critical sequence – and the only relevant to the analysis. 
Such bias may have paradoxical consequences on the usability of research 
findings. Even discounting the problems of ambiguity that structurally affects 
governmental policy decisions (Matland 1995) and of the many ‘democratic deficits’ that 
blur the chain of delegation (Fung 2006), to some scholars governments are 
unescapably doomed to fail by design: either because they concentrate too much power 
in their departments, so that any normative preference can be implemented regardless 
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of how reasonable and justifiable it actually is (Moran 2001); or because they are too 
weak, and hence some minorities are «granted concessions … in the design of public 
bureaucracies whose policy mandates they oppose» which «allow them to weigh these 
organizations down with wholly unsuitable structures that promote ineffectiveness and 
failure» (Moe 1995:126-7). Under these conditions, to avoid government failure would 
simply become impossible, and research useless. 
Moreover, a focus on antecedents implies but does not prove that special 
sequences would necessarily follow certain governmental properties; also, it may lead to 
neglect some «proximate» factors despite their recognized relevance as «efficient» 
causes – i.e., the capture of policies by special internal and interests (Niskanen 1971; 
Olson 1982; Carlsson 2000); the «‘war of attrition’ amongst interest groups […] hoping 
that another group will bear the costs» (Lundahl and Wyzan 2005:16); and misfitting 
policy instruments (Lundahl and Wyzan 2005; Vining & Weimar 1990; Wolf 1987; King 
1975).  
A focus on government as major cause of policy failures may then result into 
omissive explanatory models, and useless findings. 
 
Besides, that of causality does not seem a conventional concern in failure literature. 
Many relevant studies imply a commitment to an interpretative epistemology that pairs 
with a conscious dismissal of causality as a research goal in favor of ‘how questions’ 
alone. Remarkably explicit were Bovens and ’t Hart, who wrote of their work: «it is not a 
systematic empirical study […] designed to uncover perhaps not timeless proverbs but 
contingent generalizations about how and why things go wrong in public policymaking. 
What this study seeks to do is to shed light on the ways in which people and societies 
come to terms with highly negative events, and to what extent and how they associate 
this with the actions and policies of their governments» (1996:18).  
Such dismissal of standard explanatory strategies was justified by the recognition 
that distinct decisive interests evaluate the very same result quite differently – which 
downplays the relevance of ‘the men with the method’ and of their evaluation. 
Furthermore, the resulting multiplicity of legitimate opinions has been placed within a 
dynamic portrait of the policy process; possible causation so overlaps meaningful 
sequences in a muddle of relentless and sometimes whimsy accommodations of means 
to multiple changing policy ends. The analytical exercises used to make sense out of 
such ‘complicatedness’ – description, interpretation, classification – rest on the 
researchers’ informed appreciation of within-case special ‘co-variations’ of occurrences. 
Yet, researchers’ appreciation heavily depends on how evidence is sifted by the special 
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theory in use, whose explanatory power is rather assumed than verified. As almost any 
theory can find some supporting evidence from any case, these accounts often result 
into syncretic compositions of theories and the conclusion that «one fundamental feature 
of disasters is precisely the existence of multiple causes: an ‘overdetermination’, in 
which any number of potential causes could singly – or in combination – lie behind 
débacle» (Gray 1998:7). 
This uncertain causality however depends less on the variety of available theories 
than on a preference for in-depth research strategies – which failure analyses also 
maintain when they explicitly aim to compare and explain. Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters 
(2001) did provide 24 detailed case studies, from 6 countries selected because of their 
combination of institutional and political characteristics, in order to verify the power of 
governments’ policy styles to explain policy failures; after comparison they had to 
conclude that: «The idea of policy style is intuitively appealing, and appears to capture a 
great deal of what we know about policy making in a range of political systems. Despite 
the face validity of the concept, […] it is not effective in differentiating among countries. 
[…] These countries do at times display some of the behavior expected of them, but they 
are almost as likely to act in the opposite manner» (ibid.:647). Yet, it is consistent with 
a commitment to in-depth strategies that failure studies can conclude by claiming to 
have «revealed a good deal more about success and failure in governing» (ibid.:658), 
whereas having to acknowledge their inability to ascribe causality clearly. 
 
The common understanding of the three tenets – policy failure as a linear yet 
multidimensional opposite of success; focus on remote governmental antecedents; 
necessarily overdetermined causality – imply an ontology and a methodology that make 
clear explanations hard. For clear causal analysis to become possible, hence, a shift is 
required. This is exactly what a Realist reframing can contribute to. 
 
 
2. The heuristic gains  
from a Realist approach to failures 
In their seminal work, Bovens and ’t Hart identify three common «implicit philosophies of 
governance» (1996:95ff) for making sense out of policy failures: Optimistic, Pessimistic 
and Realistic. Optimists see failings as anomalies of a working system of well-meaning 
actors, which can be avoided at the management level simply by providing the agents 
with better information. To the opposite, Pessimists believe failures to be inevitable 
effects of a debased political system – the solution to which, if any, can only result from 
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a radical change of the whole structures and working principles. Between these two 
poles, Realists maintain a third and intermediate stance that conceives «public 
policymaking and governance as essentially fragile activities» (1996:97) – i.e. complex 
processes where policy goals and tools are always disputed, shaped by «essentially self-
centered, opportunistic, yet often mindless utility maximizers» (ibid.:98), and fuelled by 
competing values and ideologies. In such world, failures become normal occurrences: 
when ideologies result in interventions at odds with the good to produce, and when 
constraints prove unable to hold policy-shapers’ opportunism effectively in check. 
Failures are hence intrinsic to real democratic dynamics, and mendable by proper 
changes in constraints.  
These three stances provide observers with the cognitive core around which 
analyses revolve, so that to marry at least one of them is almost unavoidable. And 
indeed they all have currency in the public as well as in the scholarly discourse. From the 
perspective of explanatory research, however, the Realist alone seems fully equipped for 
casting an effective light on the causes of failures. Managers often neglect useful 
information because of reasons that stricter compliance may not remove; and radical 
changes can promise yet not guarantee that policy will succeed in a different future. 
Realism instead revolves around an unvarnished idea of the human nature, and ascribes 
policy failure to the relationship between policy ends and those behaviors allowed by the 
institutional constraints in use – and to some underlying «policy theory». The ontology of 
Realist governance so resonates with those scholarly positions that conceive policy 
design as the ground where the normative flavor of public interventions and their 
expected performance is decided (Schneider and Ingram 1990; Salamon 2002; Howlett 
2002, 2011). To adopt it thus means to look for the efficient causes of policy 
performance in policy design first – rather than in management, constitutional design, or 
government. The consequences of such adoption are especially useful to the ontological 
shift from the consolidated failure framework. 
Indeed, the Realist governance calls for the disentanglement of the usual 
analytical dimensions, as it recognizes that each dimension addresses a separate 
research question: the program, about the effectiveness of substantive and procedural 
tool-mixes in use; the procedural, about the legitimacy and consensus produced by the 
special shape of the decision-making processes for instrument choice; and the political, 
about the reasons that drove the relevant decision-makers to replace some tool or to 
keep it up. Indeed, these questions are theoretically nested (Howlett 2009); however, 
they generate distinct assessments against separate yardsticks. Such Realist 
disentanglement implies that the causal sequence assumed by the usual failure typology 
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– from the governmental antecedent to the constraints experienced by the policy-takers, 
to the outcomes and their politicization – is far from given. Rather, each connection 
between effectiveness, legitimacy and preferences has to be empirically proven against a 
proper outcome. As such, the Realist governance raises the question of how to prove 
such causal connection, so recalling a more general Realist ontology – the one set off by 
Bhaksar’s theory of science. 
 
According to Bhaksar (2008), scientific ascription of causality cannot simply follow 
the detection of an empirical regularity – as perfect regularities hardly exist, and 
moreover not all of them are causal. Scientific ascription of causality cannot follow the 
simple application of a theoretical model to cherry-picked facts, either, as this strategy 
runs at the risk of some self-confirming selection of evidences. Nevertheless, causality 
can be grasped «scientifically»: by verifying an explanatory hypothesis about a 
generative mechanism. 
This first requires a conjecture about the power of some property to make a 
difference to some other. The conjecture has to be deduced from the nature of the 
particular constituents that display the property; however, such nature is not 
investigated in itself: the structure of the particular constituents as well as the details of 
the generative process are both considered unobservable instead – which consents the 
analysis to «bottom out» and avoid the paradox of infinite regress (Glennan 2011). 
Although theory-driven, hypotheses about generative relations are hence little more than 
«educated guesses» in need of validation (Bhaksar 2008; Pawson 2004). Validation is 
nevertheless possible: at the metaphysical level, properties are true and universal – thus 
meaning that they allow for the «sameness» of the particular constituents which display 
them, although exclusively with respect to that property (Tooley 1987). In other words, 
different particulars can be expected to really behave the same, to the extent that they 
are characterized by the same degree of the same property, because of some underlying 
mechanism. 
Having imagined a metaphysically sound causal hypothesis, then, does not end 
the scientific venture. Its heuristic capacity has to be confirmed – by developing a 
consistent explanatory model to test. This can prove far from easy, as to Realists 
mechanisms are necessary at some deep potential level, while their effects are not. So, 
explanatory models have to account not only for those cases where causality holds as 
expected, but also for those where the outcome is expected yet not displayed – because 
the proper antecedent is missing, or some other mechanism has defused the generative 
relation – as well as for cases where the outcome is displayed against expectations – 
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because the model has either ignored key causal properties, or the fact that they can 
have more than one empirical expression. To Realists, hence, actual explanations are 
really «complex»: conditional on antecedents, configurative in the sense that they 
depend on the joint occurrence of special properties, and disjunctive as different 
configurations can equally obtain.  
 
Given the complexity of actual causation, Realist ‘metaphysics for science’ 
reasons that neater explanatory models can only result from a focus on special 
generative mechanisms and on their strictly related results. As such, it further justifies 
the disentanglement of research questions necessitated by the Realist ontology of 
governance. And indeed the separation of accounts of effectiveness from those of 
legitimacy and preferences entails further analytical gains from an explanatory 
perspective. 
First, a focus on the specific mechanisms activated by policy design avoids the 
government-centered bias: a tool-based explanatory model of performance does not 
question the government’s willingness, but the effectiveness of instruments alone. What 
matters here is whether the tools in use – regardless of the reasons beneath their choice 
– are enough to account for the delivered level of some «policy good» that political 
systems can be expected to provide (Almond and Powell 1982). Such an explanatory 
model is ‘metaphysically’ justified as all policy tools are capable of changing the utility 
function of the policy-takers, hence people’s courses of action and, at the aggregate 
level, the policy outcome. However, each carrot, stick and sermon activates this change 
differently – by rewarding, punishing or persuading mechanisms. Each mechanism can 
so be supposed to obtain; at the same time, each mechanism embodies special beliefs 
about the degrees of freedom that policy takers shall be left to when coordinating for the 
production of that special policy goods – which affects its effectiveness (Eliadis et al. 
2005; Salamon 2002). So, differences in the tool-mix in use can account for variations in 
an outcome, but also expose the actual results of previous games among competing 
values, and their stratification. The policy paradigms that may have had currency over 
time in a policy field can hence constitute a valid starting point for selecting the 
explanans. 
Besides, Realist explanatory models require failures to be operationalized as neat 
«results», according to criteria external to the analytical model itself – i.e., as the 
expected outcome of a clear-cut regime rather than as the policy regime itself. In this 
way, a policy can be conceived as a way to organize the production of a policy good 
(Williamson 1996) that proper measures can gauge. So, the reification of policies as 
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given programs can be avoided, and the value of explanans restored to dimensions 
otherwise used for constructing the explanandum. The need for a clear outcome also 
indicates that explanatory analysis is not suited for uncovering the whole of the effects 
generated by a program: what can be ‘realistically’ tested are hypotheses about special 
generative mechanisms, i.e., about deep causes-effect relations, in an «analytical 
closure» necessary for causality to be clearly accounted for. This closure however does 
not exclude that outcomes can be built to render trade-offs among policy goals instead 
of single goals. Independent operationalization also allows the outcome to vary across 
cases – consistently with the assumption of ‘Realist governance’ that failures are normal 
results of running policies, yet not the only possible ones. The bias in the research 
design toward negative instances alone can so be corrected.  
The resulting population of positive and negative cases then makes systematic 
comparison possible of the explanatory conditions, in line with the experimental 
rationale. The only problems left at this point are related to the technique for testing the 
model – which brings us back to the metaphysics of science. 
 
 
3. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
as a method for Realist explanations 
Metaphysical Realism is especially demanding of explanatory models, as it requires them 
to account for any possible relationship between empirics and expectations. In so doing, 
Realism also sets a difference between ‘ascertaining causality’ and ‘explaining’ some 
outcome (Bhaksar 2008): the former operation demands that empirical evidence is 
provided of the deep law-like relation between some properties, while the latter entails 
consistent justifications of the ways in which such causality actually unfolded (von Wright 
2009).  
Within this perspective, to ascertain a causal relationship implies that a 
generative mechanism is understood as the potential, or the tendency, that some 
property has to bring about some outcome (Bhaksar 2008:74). It can hence be done by 
focusing on the regularities in the behavior of properties as variables, so that the net 
effect can be singled out of the independent on the occurrence of the dependent – or its 
average probability, been the effect of confounders discounted. So, causation can 
correspond to «Granger causation», and causes to statistical predictors – although not 
the reverse (Freese and Kevern 2013). Causation is thus framed in statistical terms as 
the increase or decrease in the average likeliness of an outcome. This means that a 
proven law-like relation tolerates outliers, i.e. cases where it does not obtain because 
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the underlying mechanism has somehow remained potential. As far as to account for 
such outliers exceeds its heuristic ambition, probabilistic analysis best fits the goal of 
gauging some properties’ potential beneath actual occurrences, on the basis of empirical 
evidence but at the same time beyond it. Its scientificity is guaranteed until a proper 
design and an accurate determination of the model are provided that make the operation 
as consistent to the experimental rationale as possible, and that minimize the problem of 
omitted variables (Rubin 2005). 
Metaphysical Realists also maintain that, differently from causation, explanation 
has to account for each and every actual occurrences of the explanandum. As such it 
requires a model and a strategy able to cover both the conditions under which the law-
like relation actualizes, and those under which the relation fails to trigger. Such model 
and strategies hence have to safeguard «the hold on the individual case» (Scriven 
1959:467) which a statistical understanding does not allow: probabilistic laws cannot 
describe the actual patterns of single events because – bluntly – each event is not 
determined before it is caused to happen by a contextual balance of forces (Bhaksar 
2008:95ff.). Realist explanations account for «dead causes» alone: thus cannot be but 
deterministic, ex-post, and valid within the boundaries of a given population of cases. 
Also, they can take the form of conjunctures of conditionals, thus generating as many 
distinct configurations as required to account for special subgroups of cases with the 
same outcome – even for a single case. The identification of such configurations can 
nevertheless be scientific as far as it relies on Mill’s recognized canons for proving that 
the properties truly are conditional – material, or counterfactual. Provided again a proper 
research design, cross-case systematic comparisons can then be used to verify that the 
properties in the model are necessary or sufficient conditions to the occurrence of the 
outcome. And indeed the recognition of necessity and sufficiency is a logical operation, 
rather than probabilistic (Tooley 1987). As such, it can be treated in set-theoretical 
terms. Necessary conditions are those without which an outcome cannot occur, but that 
do not guarantee that it will: hence, given a population, a condition is necessary when 
the cases that display it are a superset of the cases displaying the outcome. Similarly, 
sufficient conditions are those which are always associated to the occurrence of the 
outcome, yet without which the outcome can still occur (because of some other 
triggering condition): so, a condition is sufficient when the cases that display it are a 
subset of the cases displaying the outcome (Ragin 1987).  
As far as Realist explanations are configurations of necessary and sufficient 
conditions accounting for the actual occurrence of an outcome within a population, the 
set-theoretical treatment of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (thereafter, QCA: Ragin 
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1987, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) appears especially suited for uncovering 
them. 
 
QCA is neither a case-oriented nor a variable-oriented research strategy: in his 
inventor’s words, is rather «diversity-oriented» (Ragin 2000). It aims to explain the 
distribution of an outcome within a population by configurations of necessary and 
sufficient conditions deemed causal after some theory – in Realist metaphysical terms, 
after some hypothesis about the triggering of special generative mechanisms; in Realist 
governance terms, after these policy paradigms that over time may have framed the 
policy good problem and tipped the balance in favor of special tools because of their 
productive capacity. The appropriateness of treating such Realist hypotheses by QCA in 
policy performance studies is underlined by Ragin himself, to whom «central to policy is 
determining which causal conditions are decisive in which contexts» (2006:18) – i.e., 
generating «circumstantially delimited» accounts of «the conditions that enable or 
disable specific connections between causes and outcomes» (ibid.:17). 
The starting point of QCA hence is an array of conditions mechanistically relevant 
to the occurrence of an outcome, which can basically be either present (1) or absent (0). 
A truth table is then derived that «exhausts» the possible combinations of presence and 
absence of each condition – i.e., the logically possible types. Cases from a meaningful 
population are then assigned to the related type in the truth table depending on the 
configuration displayed; the type is so associated an actual outcome. Whatever the 
expectations, the generative power is so revealed empirically – and not of a single 
condition, but of a whole configuration as instantiated in actual cases. These generative 
configurations can also include the absence of some property – which brings Mill’s 
«preventing or counteracting causes» into the explanatory picture, too. Moreover, the 
types with the same outcome are thus all proven ‘productive’, so that each constitutes 
an «equifinal», «primitive Boolean» causal path. 
Primitive configurations can however be redundantly detailed. Pairwise 
comparisons then «minimize» equifinal primitive paths, by dropping these conditions 
alone which demonstrate irrelevant unless a minimal number is reached of «prime 
implicants» that cannot be further reduced and that cover as many of the primitive 
configurations as possible (Ragin 1987:93ff). Prime implicants usually then consist of 
distinct and more general configurations, telling which essential combinations of 
conditions from the original model are enough to explain which subpopulations. Prime 
implicants hence are local «recipes» for the outcome – determinist, configurational, and 
valid within the boundaries of the population under scrutiny at the level of the single 
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case, consistently with the requisite of metaphysical Realism for good explanations. 
Moreover, the set-theoretical and Boolean treatment simply establishes that the 
essential implicants in the solution are of necessary and sufficient conditions to lead to 
the outcome, thus confirming the initial generative hypothesis: but it does not exclude 
that other mechanisms insist on the outcome, hence that other explanations may be 
possible. However, given the analytical closure, such possibility is simply irrelevant: to 
the extent that the model in use accounts for each and every case in the population, the 
generative hypothesis is verified. On the contrary, a single unaccounted case is enough 
to indicate that the model is underdetermined, and a single contradictory case enough to 
confute the model – first its operationalization, then the hypothesis about the generative 
conditions, and eventually the basic theory about the nature of the unobserved 
constituents (Rihoux and de Meur 2008). 
 
 
4. An example:  
explaining the inability to deliver green growth in the EU15 
Metaphysical Realist explanatory models imply a comparative research design where the 
explanans include all the generative conditions possibly leading to an outcome after a 
special mechanism. Governance Realist explanatory models narrow the generative 
conditions down to the properties of policy tools as far as they can reshape the policy-
takers’ utility function and so their policy-relevant behaviors. The tools and the 
properties which deserve attention cannot however be selected randomly. To enter the 
explanatory model, the assumption of their relevance has to be backed. Policy ideas do 
offer such backing, as policy theories defines the appropriateness of special tools to a 
special policy good that can push a policy-maker to introduce them in the field (Blyth 
2002). Realist policy models can hence develop around the many policy ideas which may 
have had currency over time – around their framing of the problem and the related 
instruments. 
In the field of green policy, ideas mainly revolve around the viability of 
instruments because of their relationship with economic growth. In the 1960s, when 
green concerns first entered the agenda, standard economics stated there was a trade-
off between the two goals: social gains could only come at the price of private losses, 
which meant that governments could only choose between green pauperization and dirty 
wealth. The theory was deemed so relevant and convincing that, as a result, interests 
and the public were assumed to polarize around a new social cleavage pitting modern 
‘productionists’ against post-modern ‘environmentalists’ (Inglehart 1990). In the 1990s, 
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Michael Porter challenged this theory at its very roots. In his view, pollution is a loss in 
market efficiency, and green policy may instead result in joint social and private benefits 
if constraints are designed so as to induce policy-takers to behave properly (Porter and 
van der Linde 1995). Despite criticisms and far from conclusive evidence, Porter’s theory 
has been widely adopted, often under the label of «sustainable development», especially 
at the international and European level (Lenschow and Zito 1998; COM(2010) 2020 fin, 
p.5). From these stances Colby (1991) recognizes five possible special balances of 
growth and environmental protection and related tool-kits which had currency over time, 
namely:  
- «Frontier economics» (FE), which revolves around the baseline axiom of unlimited or 
substitutable natural resources, and justifies their extensive exploitation for the sake 
of growth and employment. Productionist beliefs dismiss environmental concerns so 
that no specific green policy is envisaged. The hallmark is national economic market-
friendly regulation only, which is expected to result in a joint rise in resource 
depletion and economic growth. 
- «Deep ecology» (DE), which develops the position environmental movements took in 
reaction to Frontier Economics. It reverses the productionist core belief by assuming 
the environment to be the only relevant goal. Growth is deemed to be the problem in 
need of restraint for the sake of conservation. The main tool is command-and-control 
regulation with the deliberate purpose of community protection and de-growth. The 
paradigm predicts high environmental results with negative economic performances. 
- «Environmental protection» (EP), which characterizes those early green policies that 
simply correct FE at the margins. Growth is still the main priority, but environmental 
harm enters the policy agenda in the form of market failures calling for government 
interventions. The tools are command-and-control environmental regulation, and 
expenditures for ex-post ‘medical’ treatment – the burden of which lies with the 
national taxpayer collective via universal taxation. The expected results are some 
depletion constraints but also some reduction in growth. 
- «Resource management» (RM), which involves a true ideational shift because it 
believes green growth possible. In line with Porter's theory, environmental harm is 
seen as externalities that can be handled within markets, by defining the individual 
responsibility for depletion and by fostering innovation. Thus, in a context of market-
friendly regulation, technological change is made a reasonable strategy by both the 
stick of ‘polluters pay’ taxation and the carrot of targeted spending. The expectation 
is that depletion decreases while growth increases. 
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- «Eco-development» (ED), which goes further by believing that the environmental 
rationale is better able to shape economic mechanisms. The basic idea is that 
‘preventing pollution pays’, and that this becomes possible as social processes are re-
designed to function as ecosystems. The instrumentation replicates the Resource 
Management toolkit; however, the perspective moves from individual to collective 
responsibility, and community boundaries become more relevant. The expectation is 
again for a decoupling of growth and pollution trends, although the results would be 
less remarkable. 
 
If differences among policy theories refer to the trade-off between environmental 
and economic policy goals, then a proper measure of performance shall not focus on 
pollution alone. Rather, it can gauge whether and to what degree the two productions – 
of growth as «economic goods» and resource depletion as «environmental bads» – have 
«decoupled» (OECD 2002).  
Differences in such outcome may then be ascribed to differences in the incentives 
and restraints set by special tool-mixes (Salamon 2002). In them, what matter is 
whether Regulation is (1) coercive or soft; (2) pro- or anti-competition (3) 
environmentally protective; Taxation is targeted to polluters; and Spending aims to R&D 
innovation (Tab1). 
 
Tab 1. Paradigms by policy priority, distinctive attributes and expected outcomes. 
  Frontier 
Economics 
Environmental 
Protection 
Resource 
Management 
Eco- 
Development 
Deep 
Ecology 
Priority: economic high high high moderate none 
 environmental none moderate high high high 
Attributes: soft present absent present present absent 
 competitive present present present absent absent 
 protective absent absent present present present 
 targeting absent absent present absent absent 
 innovating absent absent present present absent 
 evaluating enhancing the rationale of the tool-mix when present 
Outcome: decoupling no no yes yes no 
 
Source: Author’s operationalisation of Colby (1991). 
 
All these substantive tools can however prove ineffective unless some procedural 
device is laid down to keep them accountable and on track (Howlett 2002). Ex-ante 
policy analysis may help regulators set up ‘sticks’ appropriately and learn about the ways 
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they work in the field (Radaelli 2009), while performance targets have positive effects on 
‘carrots’ (Poterba and von Hagen 1999). Together, they are expected to magnify the 
rationale of the tool-mix in use and secure the expected outcome. 
In the EU15 – considered as a relatively homogeneous population of cases 
because of the pressures exerted by the European environmental directives yet different 
enough in their environmental approach to allow for meaningful comparisons – the 
above selection of explanandum and explanantes generate the operationalization in 
tab.2, as explained in the related notes. 
 
Tab.2. Policy tools and green growth: raw and crisp values, selected countries. 
  outcome regulation taxation spending governance 
 gauge 
decou 
pling 
soft 
compe 
titive 
protect 
tive 
targeting innovating steering assessing 
evalua 
ting 
AUT raw 0.021 2.338 0.861 11.000 1.597 1.533 0.475 4.300  
 crisp 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
BEL raw 0.026 4.471 0.309 10.000 8.192 2.133 0.091 1.000  
 crisp 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
DNK raw -0.024 1.267 0.788 7.000 17.377 2.033 0.459 8.000  
 crisp 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
FIN raw 0.034 1.292 0.455 13.000 1.471 2.033 0.619 9.300  
 crisp 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
FRA raw 0.032 2.900 0.555 7.000 5.330 3.000 0.377 4.000  
 crisp 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
DEU raw 0.028 1.725 0.827 7.000 0.000 3.300 0.231 4.700  
 crisp 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
IRL raw 0.013 3.725 0.344 10.500 0.142 1.733 0.450 7.300  
 crisp 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
ITA raw 0.016 1.825 0.736 14.500 1.062 2.500 0.362 3.300  
 crisp 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
NLD raw 0.040 1.483 0.443 10.000 17.374 2.567 0.575 8.300  
 crisp 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
PRT raw -0.017 1.772 0.561 17.000 0.000 3.500 0.241 2.300  
 crisp 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
ESP raw 0.015 4.408 0.616 23.000 0.977 2.133 0.160 1.000  
 crisp 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
SWE raw 0.038 2.183 0.560 14.000 2.349 1.433 0.544 1.000  
 crisp 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
GBR raw 0.036 1.842 0.241 7.000 2.881 1.733 0.554 9.700  
 crisp 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
 
Notes: of the EU15 Member countries, Greece is dropped because of unreliable data; and Luxembourg 
because of its peculiar dimensions and policy performance which make it a little comparable case. 
As for conditions: 
- Decoupling is based on two different gauges of depletion related to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
– all taken from Eurostat (2011). GDP is measured as chain-linked volumes at 2000 exchange rates, which 
allows the within-country comparison implied by the calculation. The first measure of depletion is the national 
annual production of greenhouse gas emissions (GGE), usually used to assess countries’ progress toward the 
Kyoto targets and deemed robust enough for comparison (OECD 2002). Yet GGE alone is not enough to 
appreciate the greening of economic processes on which the paradigms of Resource Management and Eco-
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Development are based: hence the need for a second decoupling factor, measured by Domestic Material 
Consumption (DMC). DMC quantifies the annual amount of raw materials used by the national economy 
(except water and air, for which data are not robust enough), thus indicating how environmentally efficient 
national production and consumption are. The factors are each calculated on a yearly base for the period 2004-
2006. Their averages are then equally weighted into a synthetic ‘decoupling’ index so as to gauge the overall 
national system performance. 
- Soft is a measure from the OECD (2011), namely a sub-index of its wider indicator of Product Market 
Regulation. Its value refers to the use of command-and-control regulation in 2003 in the whole economy, not 
simply to the environmental sector – since the regulatory style is unlikely to be sectoral (Salamon 2002). 
- Competitive. The degree to which the rules in use hinder economic competition is quantified by a 
different sub-index of the OECD (2011), based on the barriers that overall domestic regulation exerted on 
trade and investments in 2003.  
Protective. The governments’ actual commitment to conservation is based on average 2003-2004 data for the 
protected terrestrial areas for biodiversity as a percentage of the whole country extension (Eurostat 2011). 
- Targeting. Since the relevant analytic point lies in the extent to which the tax base targets pollution, 
the measure is calculated as the average ratio in 2002-2004 between targeted revenues and the total green 
fiscal levy, using Eurostat (2011) data. 
- Innovating. The condition enters the model as the 2002-2004 average ratio of environmental 
Resource and Development appropriations out of the total green outlay, based on Eurostat data. These data 
only allow meaningful comparisons to be made for public spending levels, leaving private investments out of 
the picture. However, this choice is in line with the research focus on governments’ strategies alone.  
- Evaluating. The quantity is based on: the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s indicator of the evidence-based 
instruments in use in 2008 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009); and on the use of performance budgeting systems by 
the central governments in 2005, as calculated by the OECD Performance Budgeting Procedure Survey (OECD 
2007). 
To turn «raw measures» into «crisp scores», crossover threshold is set after the «natural gaps» identified by 
Tosmana as follows: decoupling: 0.02; soft: 2; competitive: 0.5; protective: 10.9; targeting: 2; innovating: 
2.1; steering: 0.4; assessing: 5. Evaluating results from the intersection, hence the Boolean conjunction, of 
steering and assessing – thus it takes the minimum value. 
 
Each case hence makes «empirically true» one among the 2^n possible 
combination resulting from n conditions, as in Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1. Venn diagram of policy tools for green growth 
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Keys:  Red cases display the negative outcome, green cases the positive. 
 1= soft, present (1) on the left and absent (0) on the right; 
 2= competitive, present (1) in the top half, absent (0) in the bottom; 
 3= protective, present (1) in the horizontal large rectangle, absent (0) outside; 
 4=targeting, present (1) in the vertical large rectangle, absent (0) outside 
 5=innovating, present (1) in the horizontal small rectangles, absent (0) outside 
 6=evaluating, present (1) in the vertical small rectangles, absent (0) outside 
 
The same figure also reveals that the cases of the population are not enough for 
providing each type in the truth table with an empirical outcome. These empty types or 
«logical remainders» may however be used as counterfactual conditional to minimize the 
empirically true types (Ragin 1987, 2008). When such counterfactuals are minimized 
after «directional expectations» about the contribution of each condition to the outcome, 
the model generates the following «intermediate solutions» for policy failures of green 
growth policies: 
 
innovating•protective•competitive → decoupling  (DNK) 
innovating•protective•soft•targeting → decoupling (IRL) 
INNOVATING•PROTECTIVE•competitive•targeting•evaluating→ decoupling  (ITA, PRT, ESP) 
 
These «recipes» demonstrate far from symmetric with respect to the intermediate 
solutions for policy success: 
 
innovating•PROTECTIVE → DECOUPLING (AUT, FIN, SWE) 
INNOVATING•protective•TARGETING → DECOUPLING (BEL, FRA) 
INNOVATING•protective•SOFT: → DECOUPLING (DEU) 
EVALUATING•TARGETING•COMPETITIVE•SOFT → DECOUPLING (NLD, GBR) 
 
The solutions demonstrate that the policy mixes with explanatory power do not 
precisely overlap any pure environmental paradigm; moreover, in revealing the actual 
triggering and enabling mechanisms at work in each case, they contribute to refine 
expectations about instruments and mixes.  
On the side of failure, solutions highlights how, regardless of the state of the 
economy, the absence of green constraints is actually associated to not decoupling (IRL, 
DNK); however, the joint presence of protective regulation and expenditure for 
innovation does not deliver as expected when evaluation is missing (and the economy is 
not competitive, and green taxation is designed as a collective responsibility: ITA, PRT, 
ESP). On the opposite side of success, decoupling can occur after, alternatively, 
protective regulation without public spending (AUT FIN SWE); or non-protective 
 
Research Workshop on «Policy Failures» 2014 
National University of Singapore  
A. Damonte | Recipes for Policy Failures 
 
18 
 
 
regulation with public spending and either targeted taxation (BEL, FRA) or soft economic 
regulation (DEU); or the ‘neo-liberal regulatory’ part of the resource management 
paradigm, when subjected to evaluation (NLD; GBR). 
 
Results also make two more general points. First: policy failures deserve a 
separate analysis as they cannot be explained by the opposite solutions to success. 
Second: as all the cases are covered by some causal path, that substantive and 
accountability policy tools are enough for a valid explanatory model of policy failures as 
poor delivery. Consensus and legitimacy issues hence can be left out of this step of the 
analysis. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Because of its special ontological and methodological assumptions, the consolidated 
framework for policy failures shows some limit when used for explanatory purposes. For 
explanation to become possible, the article has reasoned that a Realist shift is required. 
Such shift demands that the three dimensions in framework – program, procedure and 
politics – are first disentangled around three distinct research questions – about, 
respectively, effectiveness, legitimacy and consensus – and then reorganized as 
explanans of clear-cut explananda.  
Explanation is also a different operation from proving causality: despite both can 
stem from a hypothesis about some basic generative mechanism, the latter aims to 
establish deep law-like cause-effect relations beneath the vagaries of empirical 
regularities and hence is consistent with a probabilistic treatment, while the former 
precisely aspires to account for these vagaries. Explanations thus imply an inquiry into 
those essential conditions which actually trigger some deep mechanism, or defuse it; as 
such, they cannot be but ex-post exercises within a given population. The identification 
of the essential triggering and defusing conditions then requires a technique that still 
secures scientific results while treating evidences properly – i.e. logically.  
The QCA is demonstrated such suitable technique, as it not only starts from the 
assumptions that the occurrence of an outcome depends on configurations, but also can 
identify which of them are the essential conditions necessary and sufficient for an 
outcome to actually occur, consistently with a quasi-experimental design.  
Although the demonstration is run only on one of the three dimensions in the 
consolidated framework, it is easy to imagine the applicability of QCA to the other 
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research questions, too – once that a proper outcome is provided, and the underlying 
mechanisms identified and operationalized as a set of relevant condition. That is why the 
Realist Configurative approach is deemed a fruitful direction for future failure studies. 
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